Ukraine

[LFC]

Interesting analysis on where Ukraine is strong and where they are weak. It sounds like their major weakness is Russia's superiority in artillery. HIMARS and other weapons have been taking some of it out along with ammunition and supply lines, making the a bit less effective, but they can still be concentrated in a relatively small area and provide some real impact. Ukraine has to figure out how to deal with this better.

A really interesting analysis by @iaponomarenko about how Ukraine is trying to cope with Russian artillery strength and what it needs to do it better. Worth a close read as there are many important points.

Throughout the story the theme is that Ukraine must improve its counter battery capabilities (hitting Russian artillery once it fires and reveals itself) to try and counter Russian numerical superiority in guns

HIMARS and other ranged attacks have made a significant difference in Russian artillery capabilities, but the Russians can still mass artillery in certain areas. As for the state of the artillery war, for the first time I saw hard estimates from Ukr.

The first was that the depot attacks have reduced daily Russian artillery fire in the Donbas by half to two thirds. From 12-15k Russian rounds a day to 5-6k

Overall Russian artillery piece superiority has also been reduced but is still there. 2000 Russian artillery pieces to approx 500 Ukr. I haven’t seen such definte figures for a while

However even with the reduction in Russian fire, they can still generate heavy, demoralising fire at certain parts of the front. Not like before when compared to the large cities of Severodonetsk being hammered, but still significant.
The powerful description was of a Russian artillery attack on the small town of Pivka.

How should Ukr respond. Also important. The Ukr military is attempting a really tricky adjustment, from a highly centralised Soviet style command to a more decentralised NATO one. This poses problems as there is not one place for artillery expertise.

In particular the decentralised system means it’s difficult to create counter battery expertise to be shared amongst the army. Basically the expertise needed is complex and they haven’t been able to train consistently enough at it

[LFC]

The same analyst talks about where Russia is gaining and where Ukraine is gaining. First Russia which is making some very small gains (maps included at the link) but clearly have less ability than before.

What improvement the Russians are gaining from this seems to be simply a smaller version of what they did earlier during the very heavy phase of the Battle of the Donbas. Slow, incremental advances, no breakout, no exploitation, no ability to surround Ukr forces.

Just pound away directly in front and advance into a cleared out area. However, the Russians seem able to do this now on a considerably smaller scale than in May-June and early July. This limited area of advance seems to be the result of successful Ukrainian logistics attacks.

[snip]

So in the east the Russians are able to push forward in increasingly smaller areas. They can still generate considerable firepower in the smaller areas, but its hard to see this leading to any major breakout.

Meanwhile Ukraine has its own strategy.

In the Kherson region, the Ukrainians have not pushed forward much either, though there are indications of some advance in the far northwest.

However what they have continued to do, is hammer the logistics routes crossing the Dnieper River. As of Now Ukraine is claiming that they have taken both the major crossings at Nova Kakhovka and Kherson out of action (at least for heavy supplies).

If this is true (stress on if) this matters far more than any halting Russian advance in east. I know Ive been banging on about it for weeks, but it looks like this was the exact Ukr plan. Scare the Russians into reinforcing the west bank of the Dnieper.

And once they have, the Ukr cut the logistics links so the larger force cant be supplied. If they can carry out this logistics cuts the Russian troops will either have to be pulled out (or many will) or they will be abandoned because they cant be supplied.

In summary:

What the Ukrainians are doing is posing a series of different and difficult challenges to the Rus Army. The Russians seem able to pose one major one (massed firepower). If the Ukr can learn to contend with that (and they should if provided more aid), what will the Russians do?

[LFC]

Sounds like they bagged one of Wagner's lead propagandists.

[LFC]

This report on how things have been going shows just how neither side has the strength to make big moves. The Russians are concentrating forces in ever smaller areas to push ahead for small gains. The Ukrainians are doing the same and are concentrating on destroying the supplies and supply lines to the Russians. I don't see this ending anytime soon, especially if Ukraine decides this is their best and maybe final chance to retake Crimea.

[LFC]

Interesting.

How NASA Is Accidentally Helping People Spy on Putin’s War

At first glance, NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) website does not look like something that can help track a war. Originally built to help firefighters and other officials keep track of global wildfires, the FIRMS webpage shows something that looks a bit like Google Earth with little red dots scattered across the globe. Each dot represents a fire NASA’s satellites detected with infrared sensors pointed at the Earth’s surface.

If you move the map to Ukraine, even the most casual observer is able to see that the country is ablaze. A line of fires vaguely correlating with the front line is spread along eastern and southern Ukraine. As it turns out, NASA’s satellites, in an effort to track wildfires, are inadvertently capturing the fires in the aftermath of shelling, burning munitions depots, and other heat sources from the conflict.

For people trying to track the conflict only from public sources, FIRMS can be a lifesaver. Social media coverage of the war in Ukraine is a deluge of claims, counterclaims, unattributed or misattributed footage of fighting, as well as actors pushing their own agendas. The location and effect of air and artillery strikes, such as those by the now-famous HIMARS rocket artillery system, is one such information battlefield.

Any tool that helps verify where and when a strike by Ukrainian or Russian forces happened assists journalists and Twitter’s Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) community, sometimes called OSINTers, in figuring out what is happening on the ground. Two of the most well-publicized methods are geolocating photographs or videos and getting satellite imagery of the fighting from private companies. For instance, speculation about what caused last week’s explosions at Saki Air Base in Crimea is largely based on combining an analysis of videos taken from afar with imagery bought from commercial satellite services like Planet or Airbus.

FIRMS has quickly become another such tool in the OSINTers’ toolkit. “I think I was first made aware of [FIRMS] around mid-April this year,” OSINTer and podcast host Kyle Glen, who has since used the system on a daily basis, told The Daily Beast. According to Glen, “I mostly use it to look at areas where I know heavy fighting is occurring to try and get an idea of where the front lines are, I also use it to try and help with geolocation of videos of fires burning.”

[LFC]

Bringing things into or through Crimea is getting tougher as Ukraine targets the railways.

[LFC]

Foreign Affairs recently published a piece called:

Russia’s Repeat Failures
Moscow’s New Strategy in Ukraine Is Just as Bad as the Old One

But although Russia has had six months to learn from these mistakes, it appears poised to once again commit its depleted forces to an untenable mission: annexing and holding Ukraine’s Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia Provinces, or oblasts. Holding this territory will require substantial amounts of manpower and armored equipment—particularly given that the regions have contested frontlines and that Russian forces in each experience organized partisan attacks. And Moscow has lost its most advanced equipment, for which it does not have equivalent replacements. The Russian armed forces have also suffered tens of thousands of casualties, including well-trained personnel, and its current strategy for replenishment—recruiting new soldiers from a motley mix of communities and armed groups—will not create a combat effective force. There remains, in short, a mismatch between the Kremlin’s goals for Ukraine and the forces it has to deliver them.

The Kremlin may continue with its plans anyway, concluding that by annexing these four regions, it can force a rapid end to this phase of the war, stymie Western support for Ukraine, and buy itself time to repair and regenerate its military. If Moscow cannot marshal enough resources to support this goal, however, an exhausted Russian military will struggle to hold a contested frontline of about 620 miles. Even if the Kremlin pulls all levers available, declaring a general mobilization to call up sufficient armored equipment and trained personnel, that process would still take time. Russian forces, then, are likely to face very significant resource constraints in the next year or two. This may provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to push back against Russia’s efforts to hold all four oblasts.

Russia's scaled back goal is to annex the oblasts and get a breather. Ukraine isn't interested in that scenario.

For the Kremlin, annexation would be a means to a bigger end. Should Moscow declare these territories part of Russia, it could then proclaim a cease-fire and paint continuing Ukrainian counteroffensives as attacks on what it defines as Russia. Kremlin officials might also declare that their country’s nuclear guarantees apply to all of what they consider to be the Russian Federation, as Russian President Vladimir Putin did after annexing Crimea in 2014. Such a plan assumes that the threats would deter the United States and Europe from supporting Ukraine, prompting them to curtail or even cut off arms flows to Kyiv over fears of escalation. Over time, the Kremlin hopes, Western interest in and support for Ukraine will fade, allowing Russia to set the terms of the conflict’s settlement.

Ukraine is highly unlikely to accept any annexation or cease-fire. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has declared that “freezing the conflict with the Russian Federation means a pause that gives the Russian Federation a break for rest.” Kyiv will almost certainly also continue to ask for Western assistance. Ukrainian and Russian goals through the end of 2022 are therefore on a collision course: one side is working to prevent the conflict from ossifying along a frozen line of contact while the other works to attain precisely that outcome.

The upshot? This is going to be a long and ugly war.

[LFC]

There's a point where it's tough to justify yourself as being contrarian rather than a lying, corrupt mouthpiece spewing propaganda. This clown blew past that point. Bold stupidity mine.

Western policymakers appear to have reached a consensus about the war in Ukraine: the conflict will settle into a prolonged stalemate, and eventually a weakened Russia will accept a peace agreement that favors the United States and its NATO allies, as well as Ukraine. Although officials recognize that both Washington and Moscow may escalate to gain an advantage or to prevent defeat, they assume that catastrophic escalation can be avoided. Few imagine that U.S. forces will become directly involved in the fighting or that Russia will dare use nuclear weapons.

Washington and its allies are being much too cavalier. Although disastrous escalation may be avoided, the warring parties’ ability to manage that danger is far from certain. The risk of it is substantially greater than the conventional wisdom holds. And given that the consequences of escalation could include a major war in Europe and possibly even nuclear annihilation, there is good reason for extra concern.

To understand the dynamics of escalation in Ukraine, start with each side’s goals. Since the war began, both Moscow and Washington have raised their ambitions significantly, and both are now deeply committed to winning the war and achieving formidable political aims. As a result, each side has powerful incentives to find ways to prevail and, more important, to avoid losing. In practice, this means that the United States might join the fighting either if it is desperate to win or to prevent Ukraine from losing, while Russia might use nuclear weapons if it is desperate to win or faces imminent defeat, which would be likely if U.S. forces were drawn into the fighting.

So the Russian Army is being destroyed as an effective deployable force by Ukraine. Replacement and basic maintenance of equipment is suffering because of sanctions. Moscow is so desperate to shore up its military it's now throwing prisoners into the ranks with little training and often under-equipped. Aaaaaand they're going to cause a major escalation against NATO, even if it's NATO without much U.S. backing, uuuuhhhh ... how exactly?

Then this beaut whining about sanctions. This just screeches "I'm on Putin's payroll!!!"

The United States and its allies initially backed Ukraine to prevent a Russian victory and help negotiate a favorable end to the fighting. But once the Ukrainian military began hammering Russian forces, especially around Kyiv, the Biden administration shifted course and committed itself to helping Ukraine win the war against Russia. It also sought to severely damage Russia’s economy by imposing unprecedented sanctions. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin explained U.S. goals in April, “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” In effect, the United States announced its intention to knock Russia out of the ranks of great powers.

Then we have the NATO bullshit again. "Ukraine made us do it!" On top of that the taking of territory apparently wasn't really what was on Putin's mind but Ukraine did that by, uh, winning. He's writing for Foreign Affairs but doesn't grasp that you don't need to take and control territory if you have already taken over and control the nation's entire government.

Russian ambitions have also expanded. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the West, Moscow did not invade Ukraine to conquer it and make it part of a Greater Russia. It was principally concerned with preventing Ukraine from becoming a Western bulwark on the Russian border. Putin and his advisers were especially concerned about Ukraine eventually joining NATO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made the point succinctly in mid-January, saying at a press conference, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.” For Russian leaders, the prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO is, as Putin himself put it before the invasion, “a direct threat to Russian security”—one that could be eliminated only by going to war and turning Ukraine into a neutral or failed state.

Toward that end, it appears that Russia’s territorial goals have expanded markedly since the war started. Until the eve of the invasion, Russia was committed to implementing the Minsk II agreement, which would have kept the Donbas as part of Ukraine. Over the course of the war, however, Russia has captured large swaths of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, and there is growing evidence that Putin now intends to annex all or most of that land, which would effectively turn what is left of Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state.

There's more but other than Putin losing his shit and going nuclear it often keeps coming back to Russia escalating its attacks elsewhere. The obvious question from anybody who has been, you know, actually following the war is "With who and what?" With an estimated 80% of their resources now committed to the war in Ukraine what credible non-nuclear threat do they pose, especially to NATO?

[LFC]

More "cigarette incidents" in southeastern Ukraine. This one was at a military air base. Notice the planes lined up as targets. I guess Russia still hasn't taken to heart that they are targets.

This has caused Russia to pull aircraft out of Crimean bases. That's going to make for a longer flight to get to the front lines, especially if Ukraine pushes into Crimea.

And another explosion. This makes it sound like Russia is scrambling to preserve equipment in the area.

[LFC]

Meanwhile Putin continues to reshuffle the deck chairs. There's now a new commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

[LFC]

Here's an analysis of what Ukraine needs to be doing and thinking about as they head towards offensive operations. This.

22/ Offensive operations are expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, long range strike, armour and mobility support (engineers. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades and Divisions, will be needed. It is all underpinned by training & rehearsals.

23/ Finally, strategic support will also be necessary. Ukrainian industry, and western aid donors, will be required to provide weapons, ammunition, intelligence, and other support for an offensive. Offensive ops are enormously expensive in military material and munitions.

Here's a follow-up to that by another analyst.

As President Zelenskyy tasked his force to "shift to Kherson" (as he built the force to do it), it creates *competing missions* for both sides...but it places greater stress on RU's forces than Ukraine's.

Why? 10/

RU poured dozens of Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) into Donbas. After months, RU gained very little ground in very tough fighting.

At the same time, RU attempted to "secure" cities in the south w/ a too-small force. Ukrainians resisted.

Those are competing missions. 11/

When UA "reinforced" Kherson - threatening RU supply lines & forces in Crimea - RU was placed on the defense in another mission they were not prepared to conduct.

The "attacker" - UA - now has the advantage of choosing where they want to attack & RU must defend more places.12/

.@warinthefuture brilliantly describes the factors of politics, political objectives, military capacity, campaign objectives (the enemy force or geography), & especially timing (tempo is another key component of timing...a commander needs to know when to go fast or go slow). 13/

All of these factors - & more - are in the realm of the campaign planner. Mick gets everything right...

I'll only disagree with one thing: I believe the southern campaign has already started. Ukrainians know it, and so do Russians. 14/

Specifically, UA successful attacks on"tactical" targets (Saki,Maisk, Gvardeyskoe) in Crimea, as well as the repeated attacks against RU command posts (like this morning in Melitopal) send a signal: "You (RU) are not safe; we'll attack where we want." 15/

RU will find it difficult to hold (large) cities, establish governance with a population that is countering their actions, fight UKR territorials, defend their bases, resupply southern forces while keeping supply lines open.

How do I know this? Experience in an insurgency. 16/

Ukraine's army may appear to be moving slowly, but I'd suggest - even know - they are "preparing the battlefield."

That sometimes takes a long time, and as Mick said, time is sometimes the most important factor. 17/

And then there's what Russia needs to do and how Ukraine must counter if they begin to succeed. I doubt Belarus wants to get involved in this cluster-f*** but if Putin orders them to I don't see them having much choice. Welcome to being in Russia's sphere of "influence." And I wonder if Russia is even capable of committing that much in the way of aircraft or ships, not unless they want to leave a lot of areas unprotected and basically drain the military from everywhere in the country.

RU is trying to do a couple things to counter this, so we should be watching in these areas:
1. Generation of alliance support (especially Belarus)
2. Generation of great amount of combat aircraft to counter UA precision fires capabilities
3. Generation of a naval force. 18/

UKR must continue to:
1. Target & strike tactical targets of opportunity affecting RU's ability to fight.
2. Build (with allies help) combined arms maneuver units
3. Continue special operations
2. Advance war crime investigations
3. Maintain focus on UKR economy 19/

[LFC]

This piece, signed by 20 individuals, pushes for arming Ukraine further than we have. I don't know the names well enough to know if they were W Bush neocons bit I have to agree. Putin's Russia is a force for instability and not just in Europe and Asia. Since it doesn't seem like he's going to go any time soon the best thing to do is make him unpopular at home and crush his ability to resurrect his military in his lifetime.

Nearly 20 of our fellow experts and national security professionals — whose digital signatures appear at the end of this op-ed — agree: The war in Ukraine has reached a decisive moment and that vital U.S. interests are at stake.

Long before the Kremlin first invaded Ukraine in 2014, we have — from senior positions in the U.S. government and military — followed Moscow’s foreign policy and the grave dangers it presents to the United States and our allies. We have carefully watched Moscow’s major offensive since February and the response of the Biden administration and its allies and partners. We have maintained close touch with Ukrainian, U.S. and European officials. Two of us just returned from meetings with Ukraine’s defense and military leaders.

Although the Biden administration has successfully rallied U.S. allies and provided substantial military assistance, including this month, to Ukraine’s valiant armed forces, it has failed to produce a satisfactory strategic narrative which enables governments to maintain public support for the NATO engagement over the long term.

By providing aid sufficient to produce a stalemate, but not enough to roll back Russian territorial gains, the Biden administration may be unintentionally seizing defeat from the jaws of victory. Out of an over-abundance of caution about provoking Russian escalation (conventional as well as nuclear), we are in effect ceding the initiative to Russian President Vladimir Putin and reducing the pressure on Moscow to halt its aggression and get serious about negotiations.

Moscow’s imperialist war against the people of Ukraine is not just a moral outrage — a campaign of genocide aimed at erasing the Ukrainian nation from the map — but a clear danger to U.S. security and prosperity.

American principles and interests demand the strongest possible response, one sufficient to force the Russians as much as possible back to pre-February lines and to impose costs heavy enough to deter Russia from invading a third time. With Russian forces struggling to regroup in the east and stave off Ukrainian efforts to retake Kherson in the south, now is the time for Ukraine’s allies to pull out all the stops by providing Ukraine the means it needs to prevail. Dragging out the conflict through so-called strategic pauses will do nothing but allow Putin to regroup, recover and inflict more damage in Ukraine and beyond.

But so far, neither the administration nor European allies have succeeded in making clear why this is important to the United States and the West. It is important because Putin is pursuing a revisionist foreign policy designed to upend the rules-based security system that has ensured American and global stability and enabled prosperity since the end of World War II. Putin’s aggressive designs do not end in Ukraine. As Russian officials have repeatedly made clear, if Russia wins in Ukraine, our Baltic NATO allies are at risk, as are other allies residing in the neighborhood.

[LFC]

Another "BOOM!" but this time in Russia itself. That's approximately 50 miles back from the nearest point of the front line.

[jackd]

On arming Ukraine further, I notice they are not specific about what they mean. We're not going to give them tactical nukes are we?

[LFC]

Russia is trying to figure out how to build more and cheaper equipment by going back to an earlier version of an important vehicle. Per Wikipedia the BMP-2 is "an amphibious infantry fighting vehicle introduced in the 1980s" and it has since been replaced by the BMP-2M, BMP-3 and BMP-4. BMP-2 parts were still being manufactured for export.

3/ Last run of new build BMP-2's for Russian military was 2005-2006, last for export 2002. Spare parts production continued to maintain existing vehicles. Upgrade programs also existed, the most significant/successful being the BMP-2M.
4/ The BMP-2M includes the Berezhok module and generally the UTD-23 engine, improving firepower and mobility. Algeria purchased Berezhok module for its BMP-2's starting in 2005. Russia began its procurement later 2017-2018, reaching operational status around 2020.
5/ KMZ however may be (possibly) be reluctant about devoting resources away from BMP-3 production for several reasons. Foremost, the cost of reopening large scale production of the BMP-2 or greatly expanding the 2M may be prohibitive.
6/ Quote from Petyr Tyukov "But one must understand that the price of such products will be much higher than for new mass-produced vehicles that are produced according to plan, such as the BMP-3 and BMD-4M."
7/ Although the BMP-2 would be simpler and cheaper than the BMP-3 once production is set up, the matter of reestablishing the production line with the machinery and expertise needed is complex, time consuming, and costly.
8/ $ at play: The BMP-2 export market is primarily third world countries. Example: Yemen bought 188 BMP-2s for $40 million in 2005 ($58 million inflation adjusted). $308k per unit (assuming the cost did not include much in the way of support/spare parts).
9/ The BMP-3 has several wealthy operators, such as the UAE and Kuwait. Russia itself perhaps pays roughly $1.1 million per base BMP-3 based on state orders as of 2021. There's also the spare parts; UAE pays $10-15 million annually for its ~600 BMP-3's as of 2019.
10/ Russia's MOD surely knows this and the BMP-3's general superiority over the base BMP-2 (~100 BMP-2M's in Russian service being approximately equal in combat value). This raises the question of why they might need more BMP-2's than 3's at this point.
11/ @oryxspioenkop data as a baseline suggests BMP-3 losses (~132, 20% of Russia's existing BMP-3's) may have been higher proportionally than BMP-2 losses (~400, 10-15% of Russia's existing BMP-2's). This could be due to a variety of factors of course.
@mentions
12/ KMZ BMP-3 production maxed out at roughly 250 a year, both export and state defense contracts. Usually, it was less than this. Regardless, they may have the ability to replace most BMP-3 losses thus far, assuming data is about 70% of all actual BMP-3 losses.
@mentions
13/ But without restarting BMP-2 production, reactivating BMP-2's from reserves, and increasing the pace of 2M upgrades, replacing BMP-2 losses may actually be more difficult that the BMP-3 with KMZ's existing production set up.
@mentions
14/ Why don't Russian units simply upgrade to the BMP-3 after losing their BMP-2's? There are (possibly) training/logistical constraints on that. A unit that previously used BMP-2's would need some amount of training to transition.
@mentions
15/ A BMP-3 is more complicated. Its armament is widely different than the BMP-2. It also requires more maintenance. Although the BMP-3 is more capable of taking on the latest NATO vehicles, Ukraine is largely operating older equipment, including large numbers of its own BMP-2s
@mentions
16/ The (possible) calculation Russia MOD is although there may be greater short term costs for reactivating BMP-2 production, in the longer term dynamics of the war, it is more cost effective to continue fielding large number of the older BMP-2 than adopt the BMP-3 army wide
@mentions
17/ How serious the proposal to restart BMP-2 production is remains to be seen. The fact KMZ thinks it may be a possibility made it worth addressing though. The fact this is being considered initially seemed far fetched, but I've attempted to put forth a possible reasoning.

[LFC]

The folks on the TPM chat boards continue to post a variety of analysts. A lot of talk is about the number of things blowing up in Crimea and other points south. This thread talks about explosions at/near a railway that's crucial to the Russians. Without it their supply line times get a lot longer.

2/ The explosion site is reportedly located in or near the village of Mais'ke, 21km east of the major road and rail junction of Dzhankoi. The Russians have already said it's an ammunition explosion (which is clear from the videos posted by various people).

3/ Depending on exactly where the seat of the explosion is, this could have a lot of strategic significance. The only direct railway line from Russia to Crimea runs through Mais'ke (the nearest passenger station is in the adjoining village of Azovske).

4/ It's therefore possible that this explosion has severed one of Russia's main routes into Crimea and southern Ukraine. It will be particularly difficult to fix if it's scattered unexploded ordnance over a wide area.

5/ Following the earlier HIMARS attack on a Russian ammunition train at Brylivka on the line from Dzhankoi to Kherson, I suggested that the Russians would likely seek to relocate their ammunition dumps and truck-train interchange points to places outside of HIMARS range.

6/ And as @igorsushko points out, Dzhankoi can't be reached by the GMLRS rockets that Ukraine is currently firing from its HIMARS. So the dump at Mais'ke may represent ammunition that the Russians were hoping was now out of the Ukrainians' reach.

7/ As @trenttelenko and others have noted, this kind of distance greatly reduces the frequency with which Russia can resupply the front lines - Mais'ke is a 233 km, 4 hour drive from Kherson, for instance. So simply having to stay out of HIMARS range constrains the Russians.

8/ It's not impossible that the ammunition explosion in Mais'ke was an accident - Russia has expended vast amounts of ammunition and is now likely relying on older stocks, which tend to be less stable. Particularly with reliance on manual labour, accidents are quite possible.

9/ But there's also reportedly been an explosion at a transformer station in Dzhankoi. I've not yet seen it geolocated, but this may be related to the main Simferopol-Dzhankoi-Melitopol railway line, which is electrified (unlike the line through Mais'ke).

The post has a follow-up:

It's been confirmed that the line through Mais'ke is damaged and out of use. This will be a massive blow to Russian logistics:

😬

The dump has basically been erased from the map:

There's also follow-up on the Russian soldiers STILL storing ammunition in large, open air dumps. That's the same as we've seen at their airbases despite several attacks. It's like they simply don't give a shit anymore and that's just work they don't feel like they want to do.

[LFC]

Cheezes, it's starting to seem like a Urkainian offensive is imminent. Here's a string of posts.

One of the other tweets cited is below.

Putin has to be losing his shit at the thought that he could possibly be driven out of Crimea. His dreams of a vast Russian empire have already crumbled to dust. Now he's just trying to scrape together something he can (unconvincingly) claim as a big victory and the entire point to the war from the start.

Zelensky is smart and understands that Putin is the classic case of "If You Give a Moose a Muffin." He's already taken territory twice (from Ukraine but also in other places) and has been saying Russia deserves more. Ukraine can't allow Russia to take additional territory and then ramp their military back up because they'll simply be in the same place just a few years down the road. If they can take back territory the "facts on the ground" changes everything. We know Putin will fume and threaten which means the sanctions will stay in place and that means making it harder to rebuild the military. Good. Keep the pressure on. Putin has already proven that the only option in dealing with him is to break him. If we allow anything approaching the ordinary he'll be right back at it.

[LFC]

A quick list of things that went "BOOM!"

[LFC]

Just one day but it's a start.

There were no claimed or assessed Russian territorial gains in Ukraine on August 18, 2022 for the first time since July 6, 2022.[1] Russian and Ukrainian sources did not claim any new territorial gains on August 18. However, Russian forces still conducted limited and unsuccessful ground assaults across the eastern axis on August 18.

Lots more to digest in there, including a report that Russia may be preparing for a false flag sabotage of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

[LFC]

A former Russian paratrooper kept detailed notes on conditions, training, and actual combat operations he experienced as part of what is supposed to be an elite unit. The poster is putting up translations from the original Russian and has put up reports one and two so far. If this is remotely true I have to wonder how long before the Russian Army breaks. Will they make it through winter?

1/ A 34-year-old former Russian paratrooper, Pavel Filatyev, has published a remarkable in-depth account of his experiences of the Ukraine war. He served with the Feodosia-based 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment and fought in southern Ukraine for two months. A 🧵 follows.

2/ Filatyev was part of the force that captured Kherson in February and was hospitalised with an eye injury after spending more than a month under heavy Ukrainian artillery bombardment near Mykolaiv. By that time, he was completely disillusioned with the war.

3/ While recuperating, Filatyev wrote a scathing 141-page memoir titled 'ZOV' (after the recognition symbols painted on vehicles of the invasion force) and published it on VKontakte (Russian Facebook). Not surprisingly, he's now been forced to flee Russia for his own safety.

4/ I've previously covered Russian soldiers' accounts of their experiences in Ukraine (see below), but Filatyev's is by far the longest and most detailed yet published. No full English translation yet exists AFAIK, so I'll summarise various points here.

5/ In this first installment, I'll cover FIlatyev's experiences in the six months before the war, when he was going through training as a paratrooper in Crimea with the 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment. It was not a happy experience for him.

[andydp]

Aug 19, 2022 15:56:31 GMT LFC said:

A former Russian paratrooper kept detailed notes on conditions, training, and actual combat operations he experienced as part of what is supposed to be an elite unit. The poster is putting up translations from the original Russian and has put up reports one and two so far. If this is remotely true I have to wonder how long before the Russian Army breaks. Will they make it through winter?

The Veteran in me recognizes what we would call a "bitch session".  But there's too much here to ignore.  Even if half is true, I'm even more convinced NATO would have chewed up the Russian Army and spit out little Putin pieces.  To quote Chairman Mao:  Looks like the Russian Army is nothing but a "Paper tiger". 

A major factor in Russia's WWII victory was its overwhelming mass of artillery. Looks like that aspect is still true.  We're hearing of many artillery attacks but few infantry follow up maneuvers to occupy the territory.  This seems to be the current situation.  Plenty of bombing but no occupation.  Very much like Vietnam: take the hill/village, declare it pacified, leave, and the VC come back that night.

[LFC]

Aug 19, 2022 17:21:49 GMT andydp said:

A major factor in Russia's WWII victory was its overwhelming mass of artillery. Looks like that aspect is still true.  We're hearing of many artillery attacks but few infantry follow up maneuvers to occupy the territory.  This seems to be the current situation.  Plenty of bombing but no occupation.  Very much like Vietnam: take the hill/village, declare it pacified, leave, and the VC come back that night.

Take this FWIW since there aren't any specifics cited but if true, and I wouldn't be surprised if it was true, the Russian military is lobbing WAY more shells than they can replace. On top of that Ukraine is hammering the piss out of their supply lines. Maybe it's a panic to do something but if they back themselves into a position where they must continually conserve ammunition then their artillery superiority will melt away.

[LFC]

This guy keeps up on much of the military activity going on. It sounds like the Russians are shelling about 100+ areas every day. They also keep attacking especially NE of Donetsk but keep getting pushed back, sometimes with serious losses. It sounds like evidence of what Andy said above; "We're hearing of many artillery attacks but few infantry follow up maneuvers to occupy the territory. This seems to be the current situation. Plenty of bombing but no occupation." Russia may have already lost its ability to mount a serious offensive of any size.

Here's a few details from his post from Aug 18. Reports run basically north to south along the front. Going back 5 days it seems like the status quo. Russia lobs a pile of artillery shells. Russia tries multiple offensives and gets repelled. Rinse, wash, repeat. As of now it doesn't sound like Ukraine is launching an real offensives. They seem content blowing up planes, equipment, ammo, and destroying supply lines.

GSUA reported 131 shelling locations today.


Sivers'k.
The RuAF seems to have lost power in this area, this area consists mostly of 41st Combined arms army and pro-ru militants from the invading forces.
RU Attempts to attack in the direction of Mykolaivka-> Mykolaivka failed.


Bakhmut North.
This is the main RuAF objective on the eastern front at the moment.
RuAF attempts to advance in the following directions failed:
Volodymyrivka- Soledar
Pokrovske- Bakhmutske
Pokrovske - Bakhmut
Klynove - Bakhmut


Bakhmut south. Additional attempts were made by the Russian apes. Their attacks in the following directions ended with losses and withdrawal:
Klynove - Bakhmut
Semyhirja - Zaitseve
Semyhirja - Kodema
Holmivskyi - Zaitseve


RuAF tried to attack in the listed directions. But since the soldiers of the AFU are gene-modified bat mutations, they could sense the enemy come a mile away and stopped them.

Verkhn'otorets'ke - Kam'yanka,
Novoselivka Druha - Avdiivka,
Pisky - Pervomaiske
Lozove - Pervomaiske


Pavlivka.
The AFU stopped a RuAF attempt to advance these areas.
Yehorivka->Shevchenko
Taramchuk->Vodyane


UA Operational Command South stated:
"In Blagodatnoy, the Russians will no longer be able to replenish the ammunition, as the warehouse has been destroyed."

Changing Blahodatne liberated->contested.
When the name ends with a "Y" it usually means the "township"


"The towns of Novovorontsovka and Visokopilya, the villages of Koshovka, Ivanivka, and Osokorivka came under fire from the enemy"

The Kherson polices reported RU shellings in these towns/villages. I don't think there is enough information to draw any conclusions.


"Due to shelling by enemy troops, the territory of the farm was partially destroyed in the village of Visokopylla. After some time, the Russian military finally looted the territory of the farm, from where agricultural goods were taken from the shopping complex." - Kherson Police

[LFC]

There are differing analyses going around. This one is from a reporter over there who said she spoke to a "Western intelligence official" who says the Russians are running out of artillery ammunition.

NEW: Western intelligence official says Russians are starting to 'run out of ammunition.' 'We have a large range of evidence to suggest munitions are being depleted...inc munitions coming out of deep storage.'

NEW: Western official says falling Russian munition stocks 'ultimately will start to impair Russia's ability to launch offensives.' Says Russia has merged BTGS & is having a 'terrible time trying to reconstitute its forces...this is not a good way to improve combat effectiveness'

This one, however, makes the case that Russia is good on artillery ammunition for likely another year. One comment about this was that Russia claimed to have started the war with 15M shells but some of these are old and it's likely the number of functional shells is lower, maybe much lower. The analysis also says, "These data do not take into account about 108 million Soviet projectiles, which were recognized as obsolete in 2010, but can be used with some risk." I assume that means they're old as f*** and may simple blow up the guns they're loaded into and potentially kill the crews manning them.

4/17 How long will Russia be able to feed this beast?
According to Novaya Gazeta, Russia had 15 million artillery shells at the beginning of the war.
Also, Russia can produce another 1 million shells per year and restore 0.5 million old Soviet shells

5/17 According to my calculations, this will be enough for about 11 months.
But from November to April, Russia will certainly experience logistics problems due to bad roads.
Most likely, Russia will not experience an acute shortage of shells until next summer-autumn.

6/17 Maybe the artillery will exhaust its resource earlier?
It is difficult to say what wear Russian artillery had at the beginning of the war. But most likely, the existing artillery + restored systems from warehouses will be enough to maintain intensive shelling for 12-24 months.

7/17 Trench warfare
If Ukraine does not have enough weapons, and Russia does not have enough soldiers to conduct large-scale offensive actions, the war may turn into trench warfare in the fall.
In trench warfare, the one with more artillery has the upper hand.

8/17 Long-term war
A war of attrition is not beneficial to Ukraine, nor to the US and its allies. Russia has sufficient reserves to conduct intensive military operations. Sanctions will catch up with Putin much later than the missiles and ammunition will run out.

On a side note from that first link it appears that Russia's prized Black Sea Fleet is now effectively non-operational (or perhaps non-useful is a better term) as they are keeping it parked far away from possible attacks.

NEW: Western intelligence official just told reporters attack on Saky airfield in Crimea by Ukraine 'put more than half of Russia's Black Sea Fleet naval aviation combat jets out of use. The Russian system is busy seeking to allocate blame for the debacle.'

NEW: Western intelligence official: 'The real story is about (Russia's) Black Sea Fleet. They've lost their flagship Moskva, they lost Snake Island, they lost half of their naval aviation package and their military headquarters was struck.'

NEW: Western intelligence official: 'What we are seeing now is (Russia's) Black Sea Fleet taking a very defensive position, trying to avoid getting in the line of fire. This is a proud fleet with a long history. The credibility of that entity has been diminished.'

[LFC]

President Biden announced another aid package worth $775M.

Here's what the package includes, according to the official who spoke to reporters on background:

Additional ammunition for the high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) that it provided to Kyiv earlier
16 howitzers and ammunition
1,000 Javelins
Mine-clearing equipment
15 ScanEagle drones to assist with targeting reconnaissance for Ukraine’s artillery
40 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs) that will allow the Ukrainians to move through mined areas
High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs) for Ukraine to target Russian radars
1,500 tube-launched optically-tracked wire-guided missiles (TOW missiles) to target Russian armor
Additional Humvees
Tactical secure communication systems
Demolition munitions
Night vision devices
Thermal imagery systems
Optics and laser rangefinders

With this latest package, the Biden administration has now committed more than $10 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. This is the 19th PDA package the department has provided Ukraine with since August 2021.

Interestingly with this package it appears that he's helping them prepare for an assault.