Ukraine

[LFC]

Interesting thread on the failures of German intelligence to recognize what was happening in Ukraine. They've received a lot of shit over perceived foot dragging. Maybe the past week has woken them up.

[LFC]

Zing!

Illia Ponomarenko
@iaponomarenko

A senior expert fellow defense Ukraine analyst’s talking memo map

[LFC]

The Russian's at Kherson continue to get tenderized. They can't keep their army supplied and winter is coming. As I noted on the Russia thread the average winter in the area is like sections of New England, averaging a little above freezing for highs and in the 20s at night. (Kharkiv is 8-10 deg F cooler on average.) That's totally doable, if you have the right clothing, fuel, water, and food.

WarMonitor🇺🇦
@warmonitor3

Russian forces are continuing to use transport aircraft and boats to supply logistics to their forces above the Dnipro river at Kherson frontline.

This is not enough for them to sustain an army.

It Is also noted they are moving pontoon barges upriver close to Nova Kakhovka

[LFC]

This may be how things are settling out in Kharkiv Oblast.

Def Mon
@defmon3

Russian forces seems to have set up along the Zherebets river, about 25km from the Oskil river. Just out of the "normal" 155mm artillery range.

Here's a map.

Def Mon
@defmon3

I think this is the current status in the Kharkiv region. I do not think the AFU has crossed the Oskil river from the west, but if they have, only to establish a bridge head. The bridge by Oskil is destroyed.

I understand taking to what cover you can for defense lines but the Zherebets River is barely worthy of the term "river." There's a 7-1/2 mile long reservoir at the southern end of where they're defending but other than that, using Google Maps, I could determine that this creek is less than 100' wide in nearly the entire length. There are large sections as you move northward where it's so small you can't even see water on a satellite photo. There are a number of other rivers closer to the Russian border but I don't know if any of them is more defensible than the one they're going to try to line up on. Maybe the Aidar River which seems to have high ground on the west side but that's half way from the Zherebets to the Russian border.

[LFC]

More and more criticism of Germany's foot dragging is coming out. This is about one case where they couldn't, couldn't, couldn't until the pressure was finally so bad they could.

It's incredible. In my interview last Friday, I asked Defense Min Lambrecht why Berlin doesn't deliver at least armored vehicles like the "Dingo" to Ukraine — as France does.

Lambrecht insisted 🇩🇪 could not spare a single Dingo. Under pressure, she now agreed to send 50 [Thread]

The "Dingo" saga is yet another example of how the German government, when it comes to military support for Ukraine, continuously stonewalls and comes up with all sort of excuses why they can't do more — until they ultimately, when pressure gets too strong, cave and do more.2/

Shortly after my interview, Lambrecht held a speech in Berlin in which she said that — in light of Ukraine's recent successes — she had examined once again whether Germany could do more, but concluded that it could not.

What a few days, and strong U.S. pressure, can change...3/

This really makes me scratch my head: Why does the Scholz government always have to wait until pressure becomes unbearable? Why can't they be, for once, ahead of the curve?

And what does this episode say about Berlin's other arguments why they can't supply more weapons?4/

They just keep piling on.

Rob Lee
@ralee85

This is also strange. A small number of HIMARS significantly disrupted Russia's ability to conduct offensives since early July, and, along with other NATO artillery, played an important role in Ukraine's success in Kharkiv, which is very strong evidence they do make a difference.

Minna Ålander 🌻
@minna_alander

And then there’s ofc ex-general Vad, Merkel’s long-time military advisor, who was for months against weapons deliveries to Ukraine and still 5 days ago said that “more complex weapons” wouldn’t make a difference (and Russia has the escalation dominance)

And more.

Stunningly poor analysis of Russian capabilities that unfortunately reflects much of the German “elite” thinking.

Finland alone would crush Russian forces. Lithuania/Poland would smother Kaliningrad in a week. Russian Navy hiding behind Crimea even though Ukraine has no Navy.

Shashank Joshi
@shashj
·
Sep 15
This is the head of the Bundeswehr, but I’m now wondering if he reads the news.
m.focus.de/politik/ausland/eberhard-zorn-bundeswehr-general-warnt-vor-zu-grosser-euphorie-ueber-ukrainische-militaer-erfolge_id_146622564.html

This gets a bit more blunt.

Jessica Berlin
@berlin_bridge

Adjectives heard in DC to describe #Germany’s #Ukraine response:
“Disappointing”
“Worrying”
“Unbelievable”
“Preposterous”
“#%!$@&“

This is coming from both parties. The Scholz govt has damaged US confidence in 🇩🇪 competence (& vindicated a lot of the Trump admin’s NS2 criticism)

So why is Germany acting like this? This explanation says, as always, follow the money.

Look for hidden money & power reasons as those are the left & right hands of politics.

It isn't in Germany's economic interest to have pre-2014 border Ukraine in both NATO & the European Union.

Ukraine is a lower labor cost heavy industry & aerospace competitor to Germany's economy.

What German officials are saying makes sense, to THEM, in light of that fact.

Doing things that make the Russo-Ukrainian War longer & more damaging to Ukraine's industrial economy is in it's political-economic interests.

Making foreigners think the German elites are crazy, not calculating, is also in their interests.

[LFC]

Ukraine continues to make smaller gains up north.

Note that the only attempt at forward movement by Russia is at Bakhmut, the place where they called for a short armistice last weekend to collect "mounds" of their dead. It illustrates what several analysts have been saying all along. Russia's offensives consist of massed artillery backing head on attacks.  They are (were) prepared to fight a war of head to head attrition where they believe they can outlast the defense. Ukraine is mostly fighting a war of strategic attrition, where they use and lose MUCH less than the Russians. The number of places left on the front where Russia can fight its kind of fight are diminished. The number that Ukraine would let them to fight their kind of fight are virtually gone.

[LFC]

The story sounds the same in every place they liberate. Way to motivate an entire population to want to kill you. It's no wonder that Ukraine sees it's only path forward as joining the EU and NATO.

John Simpson
@johnsimpsonnews

A Ukrainian govt adviser tells the BBC that around 1000 dead bodies have been found in the newly captured town of Izyum, held by Russia for many months. He says there were more civilian deaths in Izyum than in Bucha, where the Russians committed documented atrocities.

[LFC]

The story of Russian soldiers refusing to fight keeps coming up again and again in different places. Looking at the hit rate of truth on so many of the reports coming out during this war my guess is that it's mostly true.

[LFC]

What now, Mr. Putin? He has to choose A, B, or some of each. I found the statement that Putin has historically been "indecisive when the stakes are high, preferring to step into situations without ever resolving them" rather interesting. He sounds very much like Trump in this regard. Everything is about tactics and short-term maneuvers. Big gambles where failure blows back directly on him? Not so much. And that tells us plenty about what Putin really thought this war would be.

Putin is now confronted with a set of harsh choices. He can keep Russia’s military commitment limited, maintaining current troop levels and continuing to insulate Russian society, or he can order a mass mobilization. Either option poses a serious threat to Putin’s legitimacy. In choosing the former, Putin would give up the prospect of Russian victory and run the risk of outright defeat. Already, the nationalist pro-war forces he has released have become more and more dissatisfied with the conduct of the war. They had been promised land and glory in a rapid campaign. Instead, they have received a staggering death toll for minor territorial advances, which now look increasingly precarious. Continuing the status quo could create dangerous new fissures in Putin’s regime.

Mobilization, on the other hand, would radically upset the Kremlin’s careful management of the war at home. Dramatically increasing Russia’s manpower might seem a logical choice for a country with a population that is three times the size of Ukraine’s, but the war’s popularity has depended on it being far away. Even the Russian terminology for the war, the “special military operation,” has been a hedge, an obfuscation. Despite the Kremlin’s rhetoric of “denazification,” for the Russian population the Ukraine war is entirely unlike the direct, existential struggle that Russia endured in World War II. By announcing a mobilization, the Kremlin would risk domestic opposition to a war that most Russians are unprepared to fight.

Of course, Putin may choose neither of these options. He may seek to change the war by finding a middle way between full mobilization and continuing the status quo. Though he is a self-styled man of action, Putin tends to be indecisive when the stakes are high, preferring to step into situations without ever resolving them. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia moved into eastern Ukraine, signed a diplomatic agreement, and then dithered for years, neither advancing nor retreating. In Syria, Russia made its move in 2015, backing up Bashar al-Assad militarily and turning the tide in his favor. But Syria remains up in the air, with a political solution to the war entirely out of sight.

[LFC]

One of the better analysts agrees with Biden's decision on not sending longer range weapons yet.

Warning: This will NOT be a popular thread. I anticipate a high degree of pushback from those who follow me.

But...I thought it might be useful to provide some thoughts as to why the US may be "rebuffing" the request to provide ATACMS to Ukraine. 1/15

This topic will be a topic as @potus announces the next Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for Ukraine military aid, which may occur in 2-3 days, with a new tranche figure somewhere between $500-750M.

The package will likely consist of mostly HIMAR pods & artillery 2/

Many will ask: "Why no longer range ATACMS?"

Most of those asking may not know the difference - besides the extended range - of ATACM missiles versus HIMAR rockets. So here's some details comparisons: 3/

[LFC]

Meanwhile in the Russian occupied Luhansk region...

Rob Lee
@ralee85

The LNR Prosecutor General and his deputy were killed in an explosion in his office in Russian-occupied Luhansk.

The resistance by those trapped for years in Russian held areas continues.

[LFC]

Highlights of the ISW (Institute for the Study of War) assessment from Sep 16. Tons of details including maps at the link. Bold of Russian desperation mine.

Key Takeaways

• The discovery of mass graves and torture chambers in liberated Izyum confirm previous ISW assessments that the Bucha atrocities were emblematic of Russian activities in occupied areas rather than an anomaly.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently threatened to expand Russia’s attacks on civilian Ukrainian infrastructure if Ukraine continues reported attacks on military facilities in Russia.

• The Ukrainian Resistance Center warned that Russian forces may conduct false flag attacks in occupied areas between September 17 and September 20.

• Ukrainian forces captured all of Kupyansk City on September 16, continuing offensive operations east of the Oskil River.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly shelled targets in Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast, Russia, overnight on September 15-16.

• Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s occupation headquarters in Kherson, likely using HIMARS, and are continuing ground maneuvers in three areas of Kherson Oblast as part of the ongoing southern counteroffensive.

• Russian administrative officials are rallying around Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s call for “self-mobilization” at a local level to provide additional forces to the Russian military.

• Forced Russian mobilization campaigns are likely depleting male populations in parts of the claimed territory of the Russian proxy Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) along the front lines.

• Immediate and coordinated Russian information responses suggest that Ukrainian partisans may not be responsible for the September 16 assassination of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Prosecutor General and his deputy.

[LFC]

Some more analysis on the Kharkiv operation, this time from a German general.

Here is Gen. Christian Freuding, head of the Ukraine op room at the German MoD, in a detailed discussion on the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which he calls a "textbook" use of mechanized forces.

He highlights element of surprise and compares the Ukrainian opening of 2nd front at Kharkiv to the 1st Cav feint at the start of the Gulf War (wrongly suggesting Kherson was a bluff). Estimates UA successfully brought up around 3 Brigades, leading to a local force ratio of ~4:1.

Ukrainian success a result of exemplary application of "eternal laws of land warfare": Massed use of rapid, mechanized forces to achieve and exploit breakthrough at weak point in enemy lines. Russian claims of "regrouping" belied by abandoned arms, failure to establish 2nd line.

Russians now need to reorganize and reestablish defensive lines. Freuding points out the previous front line was 1,300km - comparable to NATO/Russia border - which Russia always lacked forces to hold and which "military sense" suggested should have been consolidated far earlier.

On role of Western arms: Ukraine can only go on offense once they have necessary materiel -- now be the case. UA now have advantage in long-range precision fires. Western systems, including German MLRS and PzH, clearly key but only ever complementary to Ukrainian combat power.

From his recent visit to Kyiv: Ukrainian partners note value of PzH 2000 in particular. But after weeks and months of use in intense combat, material fatigue becomes an issue. "All efforts" of his staff are now directed towards sustainment to keep major weapons systems in fight.

[This squares with FM Baerbock's recent interview from Kyiv in which she emphasized efforts to set up a repair and sustainment hub on Polish border in addition to opening dedicated production lines for ammunition -- to sustain and eventually expand existing capabilites]

On Russian materiel left behind: In an orderly withdrawal, forces should have destroyed stockpiles and major weapons systems. Freuding says there are estimates captured weapons amount to "almost a full brigade" which he thinks Ukraine will be able to quickly return to service.

So they brought up 3 brigades for the operation and now the Russians have left them enough equipment to create nearly another full one as long as they have the manpower.

[LFC]

Ukraine is reportedly moving on the west bank of the Oskil River. That's where Russian troops are apparently trying to dig and and defend.

It appears they've already established control over the northern part. I'm no military strategist but it seems like a defensive position with a river to your front is a good thing. But if Ukrainian troops swing around and can come at your flanks and rear, pinning you against that river, that's a bad thing.

[LFC]

ISW update for Sep. 17. Bold of Russian head scratching actions mine. Also the fact that Russia is fighting against a nation, not a military.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continue to prioritize strategically meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut over defending against continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces liberated a settlement southwest of Lyman and are likely continuing to expand their positions in the area.

• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct an interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast.

• Russian forces continued to conduct unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.

• Ukrainian sources reported extensive partisan attacks on Russian military assets and logistics in southern Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian officials continued to undertake crypto-mobilization measures to generate forces for war Russian war efforts.

• Russian authorities are working to place 125 “orphan” Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk Oblast with Russian families.

[LFC]

And now a few moments of failure to acknowledge reality.

[LFC]

Ukrainian trolling continues as part of their campaign to uplift their people's spirits and grind down Russia's morale.

Defense of Ukraine
@defenceu
Ukraine government organization

In the past week, the #UAarmy received thousands of tons of ammunition as a gift from the Armed Forces of 🇷🇺 Please note that we do not accept gifts from murderers, torturers, looters, or rapists. In the coming days, we will return everything, right down to the last shell.

[andydp]

The prior reports are amazing.  I never thought the Ru Army was that inept.  

Some things I noticed besides the abandonment of weapons, ammunition and supplies:  there are no (or very few) reports of booby traps on these materials.  If they were half competent, there would have been some hidden "easter eggs" in those ammo cases.

One report mentioned Ru Army seems to have no fall back positions.  Hand in hand with that is "contingency" plans if the enemy were to attack at places other than your front. Doctrine says flank attacks are the best.  Failing to defend the flanks whether with people or obstacles is an open invitation.  I should note obstacles also have to be under observation so you can call in artillery.  In WWII the Germans had some great obstacles but they didn't have them under observation. Guess what happened.

We also note the materiel left behind will certainly be used by the UA.  Standardization in the Warsaw Pact is paying dividends.  (NOT in the way they assumed it would.) 

We did war games for 20 years assuming an overwhelming Russian attack in the "Fulda Gap".  The collapse of the Russians is simply amazing to me and to my friends. We never thought they would be this bad.  We knew their training was "set piece" and top down driven.  They had no room for incentive at the lower unit level.  One thing we were told: take out the tank with the most antennas. (Commander's tank) Russian tanks typically only have a radio receiver to get orders.

[LFC]

Sept 18, 2022 16:18:19 GMT andydp said:

The prior reports are amazing.  I never thought the Ru Army was that inept. 

It's interesting that there are two camps on this, both which are surprised but one which is less surprised. The former consists of just about everybody. The latter contains people who actually saw the Russian military up close during various cross-alliance events that took place during a more friendly time. Those people said they always knew the Russian military was a shitshow, just not THIS much of a shitshow.

[LFC]

Russia just gave another big military intel coup to the West. While the U.S. is spending a lot to help Ukraine it's not like we're only getting intangibles in return.

[andydp]

Sept 18, 2022 18:38:29 GMT LFC said:

Russia just gave another big military intel coup to the West. While the U.S. is spending a lot to help Ukraine it's not like we're only getting intangibles in return.

Couple that with the capture of the jammer this is literally an early Christmas

[LFC]

Down south in Kherson Russia is quickly running out of options.

CJ
@casualartyfan

Nova Khahovka, per @artisanalapt

Russians have two routes to supply their dwindling forces across the Dnipro:

1.) Ferry active downstream of the NK Dam, which is constantly hit by long range 🇺🇦 fires

2.) Repair the NK Dam Bridge which has collapsed due to GMLRS

[LFC]

This is desperation. As has been pointed out by those more knowledgeable of military logistics, who the hell would want to drive heavy equipment across a support made out of stacked up train cars? It's been pointed out that Russia gave up on the pontoon bridges because a) Ukraine was blowing them up regularly and/or b) they're running out of pontoon bridge parts.

The Kyiv Independent
@kyivindependent
⚡️General Staff: Russian military prepares ways of retreat in Kherson Oblast.

Specifically, Russian troops sank nine railroad cars near the Kakhovka hydropower plant in order to build a crossing on the Dnieper, Ukraine's General Staff said.

At least they managed to gum up the canal used for shipping on the river. On that score, assuming they're planning on leaving soon, they're leaving a future shit-show behind for Ukraine to clear up.

[andydp]

Sept 19, 2022 18:17:48 GMT LFC said:

This is desperation. As has been pointed out by those more knowledgeable of military logistics, who the hell would want to drive heavy equipment across a support made out of stacked up train cars? It's been pointed out that Russia gave up on the pontoon bridges because a) Ukraine was blowing them up regularly and/or b) they're running out of pontoon bridge parts.

The Kyiv Independent
@kyivindependent
⚡️General Staff: Russian military prepares ways of retreat in Kherson Oblast.

Specifically, Russian troops sank nine railroad cars near the Kakhovka hydropower plant in order to build a crossing on the Dnieper, Ukraine's General Staff said.

At least they managed to gum up the canal used for shipping on the river. On that score, assuming they're planning on leaving soon, they're leaving a future shit-show behind for Ukraine to clear up.

Actually, its pretty ingenious.  Put some of the surviving decking on top of the rail cars and you have a "bridge".  Problem is it will NOT be able to handle the heavy stuff (like, say, tanks).  A lot of drivers may be hesitant to drive over the "bridge".  I would use the surviving decking from the destroyed bridge parts. Based on their logistical and transport reputation during this "special operation", not going to be easy.

"Lack of bridge parts" is a problem for any armed force.  The equipment is specialized, expensive, you need specially trained personnel and believe it or not, you also need special boats to put the equipment in place.  

[LFC]

I guess a number of men are choosing to be Ukrainian POWs rather than Russian prisoners. Good job, Russia!