Ukraine

[LFC]

Russia's Black Sea Fleet was less invincible then they though. It took some massive hits and is now hiding behind Crimea, unable to bring much to the war effort. Their expected air dominance has suffered the same fate.

Ukrainian air defenses have shot down at least 55 Russian warplanes since the start of the war in late February, a U.S. general said Monday, saying the huge losses are a major reason Russian fighter planes and bombers have not played much of a role in the conflict.

Ukrainians took down those planes using older Russian-made air defenses, forcing the Russians to severely limit the sorties they flew near Ukrainian positions. The shootdown also cut Russian ground forces off from the kind of air support they would need to take and hold territory, Air Forces in Europe and Africa commander Gen. James Hecker told reporters at the annual Air Force Association conference.

That lack of protection from the sky has been one of the big surprises of the war, as most analysts expected Russia to quickly establish dominance over Ukraine’s airspace in the early days of the invasion. That failure allowed the Ukrainian air force to regroup and survive mostly intact. Hecker estimated that Ukraine retains about 80 percent of its air force, seven months into the war.

At the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at Ramstein Air Base in Germany this month, one of the “big asks” from the Ukrainians was more SA-10 and SA-11 air defense systems in order to fend off Russian drones and aircraft, Hecker said.

The U.S. doesn’t produce or use the missiles, so the onus is on European allies to supply them to Kyiv.

One thing that won’t likely make its way to Ukraine soon is the U.S.-made F-16 fighter plane, which Hecker said wouldn’t arrive for two to three years after any political decision was made to send them, due to training and logistical issues. The general wouldn’t count sending F-16s out, however, saying “folks are starting to think more long term” in how to equip Ukraine for a war he said will likely last years, not months. POLITICO reported last week that officials are conducting early discussions over whether to send the jets to Ukraine, along with Patriot missile batteries.

But the aid is all contingent on decisions made by politicians in Washington and across the capitals of Europe, leading to delays in some weapons the Ukrainians have for months insisted are critical for their survival. There is increasing pressure on Germany in particular to allow third-party countries to send German-made Leopard tanks and artillery systems to Ukraine, something Berlin has so far refused to do.

[LFC]

Equipment destruction update:

Date   Vehicles     Tanks       Since 2/24
3/18:  1574         244         3 weeks
3/25:  1831 (+257)  289 (+45)   4 weeks
4/01:  2175 (+344)  359 (+80)   5 weeks
4/07:  2614 (+439)  449 (+90)   6 weeks
4/14:  2885 (+271)  505 (+56)   7 weeks
4/21:  3068 (+183)  528 (+23)   8 weeks
4/28:  3248 (+180)  580 (+52)   9 weeks
5/05:  3417 (+169)  605 (+25)  10 weeks
5/12:  3623 (+206)  664 (+59)  11 weeks
5/19:  3675  (+52)  671  (+4)  12 weeks
5/27:  4150 (+475)  733 (+62)  13 weeks
6/02:  4207  (+57)  747 (+14)  14 weeks
6/09:  4273  (+66)  762 (+15)  15 weeks
--
7/05:  4573 (+200)  830 (+68)  19 weeks
7/12:  4683 (+110)  865 (+35)  20 weeks
7/19:  4738  (+45)  869  (+4)  21 weeks
7/26:  4822  (+84)  887 (+18)  22 weeks
8/02:  5038 (+216)  922 (+35)  23 weeks
8/09:  5103  (+65)  930  (+8)  24 weeks
8/16:  5200  (+97)  952 (+22)  25 weeks
8/23:  5321 (+121)  970 (+18)  26 weeks
8/30:  5362  (+41)  988 (+18)  27 weeks
9/07:  5554 (+192) 1022 (+34)  28 weeks (one day late)
9/13:  5907 (+353) 1087 (+65)  29 weeks
9/20:  6202 (+295) 1155 (+68)  30 weeks

Russian loss counts remain high as they learn more about what was lost in Kharkiv.

[LFC]

Here's an analysis of Putin's ability to call for a general mobilization from a Russian expat. If this is remotely accurate, and it sure does make sense, general mobilization would mean virtually nothing in terms of providing battle ready troops and units. This is very different from what Ukraine has been accomplishing.

"Why mobilization in Russia will fail and nothing will help Putin’s army right now. A short walk on the hot tracks.

The authorities of the occupied territories are about to hold their pseudo-referendums. This will not affect the war, but everyone thinks that it will be an excuse for Putin to start a general mobilization in Russia. We’ll let it be. What will be then?

Well, they mobilize a million people, to begin with. From those who served, those who did not run, and those who are young, under 30. It is quite possible, they will even be able to organize some. There are that million new recruits. So what? They will not be able to fight right away.

Where will the Russian army take a million armor vests? A million helmets? A million pairs of socks, underwear and a uniform? It is necessary to double the entire Russian army at once. And we know that right now the same armor, helmets and underwear for warriors are collecting donations. The army doesn’t have any.

The second question is education. Even simply holding and charging the machine needs to be taught for a week. Just discipline - a month minimum. I’m not talking about all the tricks there and stuff. Even just the official term of training is a year, it is established by the army itself ) In reality it seems that to teach

more or less an adequate military is possible in 3-4 months, but also that, it will be a reservist who needs to be behind the main forces and gain experience. So when you hit a million now, you can prepare them for January/February. It’s not the most convenient time to start combat.

But there’s no one to teach. All more or less experienced soldiers have already been gathered at the front. Even officers from those parts that are not at war were taken to the front. Usually, to create a combat-ready unit, the mobilized are mixed with the experienced ones. There’s no one to mix with anymore. Well, there’s definitely nowhere to put a million. That is, it will be like in the Great Patriotic Day near Moscow, when they were forced into battle immediately after the mobilization - just to cover the holes. And at the same time, Ukrainians are fighting with well-motivated and prepared units.

Problems will arise even when a million people are brought to the front. We see that the logistics of the army’s growth are barely coping with the current load. And it will grow 5-6 times. Cheesy food will not come from anywhere, I’m not talking about everything else. And where can I get so much equipment for these soldiers?

If the Russian army will use mobilized people as “cannon meat”, like mobiks from “LDNR”, then again, it will not bring any results. Only huge victims and public anger, which will no longer be pacified by propaganda and money (there will not be enough for all funerals).

Considering all these factors, I believe that mobilization in its emergency form is now pointless and will not bring any adequate result. All these measures must be prepared, starting with the accumulation of military property and building training camps.

And to get now in autumn and winter a million mouths that need to be fed somewhere on military bases and kept under control is explosive for the Russian army and authorities. Therefore, it seems to me that there will be no mass mobilization.

If there will be, then some limited mobilization, say, 100,000 people who could replace the failed “volunteer battalions”. They will come up with some criteria and take thousands of guys from the regions (NOT St. Petersburg and Moscow), who will then be thrown to the front.

Although, of course, you cannot overlook the madness of the dictator. Putin can do anything in Russia with one decision and then officials, army and just people will sort it out. The issue of mobilization is much more interesting to follow than pseudo-referendums, and I will do it)

P.S. Mobilization is subject to those who served in the army, that is, over 19 years old. Usually, a mobilization goes in waves. Start young and go on as needed. It seems impossible to take away the deadlines that serve now, either by mobilization. But Putin can come up with anything("

[andydp]

Excellent synopsis of what has to happen in a mobilization. I'm not going to get into the personnel side.  We know what that will result in.  Suffice it to say the mujiks will bear the brunt of his ego.  Based on the reports we read here, Russia has been losing equipment in Ukraine which isn’t being replaced. They’re pulling out what US would call strategic stockpiles.

I’m willing to bet the Russian equipment isn’t going to be ready anytime soon.  I could go into detail, but the problems/issues will keep on cascading and escalating. It’s not going to be “pretty”. Let’s say you want to get a Soviet tank going again: if the systems haven’t been stripped, stolen and sold (or cannibalized) it’s going to take a lot of trained mechanics to get it running. Not to mention spare parts. **

We’re smart enough to know they’d be lucky to get a brigade in six months.

**I should add, these platforms don't have any of new technology: such as reactive armor or target acquisition.  They will be sitting ducks on a battlefield.  I remember a special on PBS where they interviewed a former tank officer of the Soviet Army.  The tanks have manual transmissions, drivers are issued a hammer to bang the gear levers.  He also said they usually just start them and drive them about ten feet and call it a day.

[pnwguy]

Could have gone in political humor, of course.  But it would be great to see happen.

[indy]

Putin announces 'partial' mobilization, www.businessinsider.com/putin-speech-partial-military-mobilization-draft-reservists-ukraine-war-2022-9

Personally, I doubt this will help the effort all that much but it is going to ratchet up the body count. I would guess at the moment there is a greater than 50% chance that a full mobilization will follow at some point.

Lack of decent equipment will not be a deterrent because it never has been. They have plenty of rakes and pitchforks. It's laughable to think Putin cares if they are properly trained. He couldn't care less. I think the only way this ends is with Putin dead. Given how many mysterious deaths are occurring in Russia right now, that seems less and less likely.

ETA: As part of the effort, laws against desertion, refusing to fight, and surrendering will be 'toughened', including a possible 10-year sentence for refusing to fight. Today, lots of people who already left Russia are no longer second guessing their decisions.

[indy]

Apparently, Putin said in his speech that this mobilization would be limited to reservists and other civilians would not be called up. However, the law that is currently under consideration for the mobilization (and is expected to be passed) makes no such distinction. Not sure of the details about this or even if it is accurate, as everybody is still translating and the available information is confusing and contradictory.

ETA: If this is true, then of course this is really clearing the way for a full mobilization but it will just never be called that.

[indy]

Some people who hadn't left Russia yet think that now might be a good time.

[LFC]

Putin's speech is brimming with the usual crap but watching his face he looks ... whipped. It's almost like he's on drugs because he has virtually no facial expressions. After seeing some of his pathetic "manly" stunts (bareback on a horse, "playing" hockey) he may have also resorted to Botox to try to make him look younger than his 69 years. That can destroy facial expressions.

Like Trump and the Republicans he's playing the perpetual victim. He brought up NATO attacking Russia because, yeah, they've been real eager to do that since WWII. The one key that was pointed out by an analyst, though, was that Putin is going to jam through sham separation votes in the occupied territories and then claim any attack on them is an attack on Russian territory. With China, India, and Turkey all telling him he's failed and has to back out he's desperate for any kind of political cover. The problem is that it's way too late for that. 

Remember that this is the guy who people were calling an evil genius. The only genius I see is the same brand that I see in Trump. He's a narcissistic psychopath who doesn't care who he hurts and is willing to break the norms more civilized people live by and then play the victim if he gets called out on his shit. It really is as simple as that. And it's been working for far too long.

Here's Putin's speech. The WMD threats start around 10:14.

[indy]

I don't think Putin can survive a loss in Ukraine and I don't mean politically. Hence my opinion that a full mobilization was always on the table and even likely once things started going against him there.

[LFC]

This is sort of a status analysis. Here's the part about how Ukraine prepared their military and how they are now quite possibly the best army for 21st century warfare in the world.

The last two weeks have answered a central question of the Russo-Ukraine War; can Ukraine undertake the offensives required to liberate their people & reoccupy their territory? They have answered this question emphatically with their Kharkiv offensive. 1/19

2/ During this offensive, I had the opportunity to visit #Ukraine and to speak with high level military and government officials. I took away three key observations from the visit.

3/ First, the Ukrainians are competent. This is a gross understatement. No military this century has had to fight across all the domains of war concurrently, and do so against a larger and better armed adversary.

4/ Their most important preparation for this war was not physical but intellectual. They re-trained their troops away from Soviet centralised command methods to adopt more decentralised C2. This has been a clear difference between the two belligerents.

5/ Beyond this, the Ukrainians have adopted what I have described elsewhere as a strategy of corrosion. They have attacked the Russians at their weak points constantly, destroyed their logistics, and slowly killed as many Russian battlefield leaders as possible.

6/ At the strategic level, their global influence campaign has set a new benchmark for effectiveness. This Ukrainian competence has resulted in a military institution that is now without peer in the art and science of 21st century warfare.

[LFC]

Another brutally honest recap and an eye roll on Putin's new plans. In full:

Let me get this straight:
1. Russia thought their "special operation" would last 3 days.
2. After 2 months of fighting with Spetsnaz, Airborne & 190+ BTGs, they achieved NONE of their Strategic, Operational or Tactical Objectives.
3. Based on #2, they decided to shift... 1/8

...their main effort to the Donbas, where they expended 70+% of their precision munitions hitting civilian targets, while failing to gain any significant military objectives.
4. Then, Putin announced RUF would secure Luhans'k & Donetsk by 15 September.
5. RU "mobilized"...2/

... the LPR & DPR militias, "recruited" prisoners, "drafted" locals, asked for soldiers from other countries & brought in the Wagner Group to execute #4.
6. But, after announcing & then delaying the Kherson referendum & under threat of a UKR offensive in Kherson...3/

...RU generals shifted effort from Donbas to Kherson due to threat of a UKR offensive.
7. After RU shifted forces as described in #6, UA instead conducted a Kharkiv offensive, gaining the equivalent of the land mass of Rhode Island & Delaware while capturing a...4/

Brigades worth of Russian tanks & BMPs and killing hundreds of RU soldiers.
8. Though now "paused" in Kharkiv, UA continues to execute attacks in Kherson, is slowly gaining ground in Donetsk, while threatening Melitopol. 5/

9. While this is happening, ships from the RU Navy - the "pride of the Black Sea" - are repositioning from their base in Sevastopol into the Azov for "security reasons" & RU subs are launching Kalibr missiles at UKR infrastructure. 6/

And - here's my point - after all of this, Putin's response is to INCREASE punishment for deserters & execute a partial mobilization of 18-60 year old men (who didn't get much training the first time around & who will serve as "cannon meat") and continue this madness? 7/

If this is an accurate summary of the last 210 days, Putin - and his supporters, generals & Army - will surely go down in history.

But not in a good way. 8/8

[LFC]

This is a look at Putin's speech but it's the first tweet that really defines how difficult his situation in Russia has become. He has multiple audiences to keep happy.

The speech from Putin today is a careful balancing act of a leader under pressure, who is trying to: 1. please hardliners and Russian milbloggers; 2. not displease the general populace; 3. appease the military; 4. give the impression he is not losing a war. 1/20

[LFC]

A look at Putin's desperate ploy of "officially" annexing the entire Donbas. It has all the obviousness of a child claiming the dog ate their homework. And it's not going to mean shit. The fact that he does brings us back to him not really being the evil genius people claimed he was. He's just a thug.

{Sigh} It's here at last. As i wrote, referendums to annex Ukrainian territory into Russia. They've been laying this groundwork for months. Today, accompanied by harsher penalties for desertion and refusals. Here are considerations for what's next (1/)

Why annex? As I wrote, because the Kremlin needs this phase of the war to end ASAP to repair itself and rebuild. They hope annexation shocks the int'l system, and their nuclear threats over "Russian territory" will compel a ceasefire, or slow down support for Ukraine. BUT: (/2)

Ukraine has made it clear it will reject annexation or this kind of ploy. The Kremlin's design is to also frighten Ukraine's supporters with escalating stakes and violence(with a background energy crisis). They've signaled as much with their strikes this week. (/3)

Here is my concern and why the stakes are increasing now: if the Kremlin's annexation gambit fails to stop the fighting and support to Ukraine, the Kremlin will need to lash out to show it is serious. That means escalation that could come in different forms (/4)

In sum, Russia prepped for months that it can stop Ukraine and its backers with annexation and threats. probably to include a bogus ceasefire option and nuclear saber rattling. I don't see Moscow's plan working. Then what could come next is a Russian lash out. (/8)

[LFC]

I think this is a good assessment on Putin using nukes from alphadad over at TPM's chat room.

I remain unconcerned. My thinking is as follows:

1.) He either will, or he won’t, but that is not under our control. The response from the west and Ukraine is just and 100% necessary, and while we can and should do everything within that response to minimize risks of escalation, we cannot cower in fear or back down.

2.) Putin is a bully, and bullies are cowards. He’s always picked on the weak and defenseless. (The only reason he went into Ukraine is that he thought it would be easy… that Ukraine was gong to be another pushover.) Cowards always back down when forced to make an ‘existential’ choice. Putin is willing to risk and ruin everyone else’s life - but not his own. Nukes won’t happen.

I think the bully / coward description is pretty apt.

[LFC]

Here's a list of reasons why Russia still has the much heavier lift, one that will only get worse over time.

Rob Lee
@ralee85

Even if Russia mobilizes (I think deploying currently serving conscripts is more likely), almost all of these factors still favor Ukraine, including over the medium to long-term. A large number of poorly trained and motivated soldiers isn't a huge advantage.

Rob Lee
@ralee85
 
Ukraine has an advantage in:
-manpower
-learning lessons
-interior lines
-command and control/leadership
-clearer strategic goals
-precision fires
-morale
-ability to strike behind Russian lines (partisans)
-training volunteers
Many of these will grow over time. I'm optimistic. twitter.com/RALee85/status…

Ukraine's biggest risk if the loss of Western support.

[LFC]

This is a longish thread but well worth the read if you're interested in how poor Russian supply lines are, how much they are utterly dependent on rail, how at risk the rail lines are, and what would happen if the U.S. supplies Ukraine with longer range ATACMS missiles for use against the Kerch Bridge and Crimean air bases. They could effectively strand 70,000 troops without supplies in the middle of winter. Here's a bit about Russia's general problem.

Why are russian propagandists and the Kremlin so afraid of ATACMS missiles... is it a fear of striking deep into russia? is it a fear of striking symbolic targets?

No, it's all about logistics. A thread 🧵:

russian military logistics are a disaster: no forklifts, no pallets, too few trucks, bad maintenance, corruption, incompetence, no movement control units - without access to a railroad russia can't supply its troops.

Here's how it's playing out in the Kharkiv region.

The moment Ukrainian troops arrived outside Kupiansk, russian troops fled from Izyum, as without the railyard at Kupiansk there was no chance to supply the Izyum salient. 4/n

With the flight from Kharkiv russia is now down to two fronts:
• East: Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts
• South: Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea oblasts
Let's look at the main railroads in the East first (colored blue): Kupiansk, the main rail hub for the Luhansk sector, has 5/n



liberated by Ukraine. Debaltseve and Ilovaisk, the main rail hubs for the Donetsk sector, are in GMLRS range (yellow circles).

This forces russia to unload trains 100+ km from the front and truck supplies the rest of the way, but
russia doesn't have enough transport units for 6/n

this. This shortfall in transport capacity has already led to russia being unable to pursue offensive operations in the Donetsk sector.

The logistic situation is even worse for the Luhansk sector, where distance are longer and roads worse. I believe these problems will force 7/n

russia to retreat further in Northern Luhansk.

ATACMS wouldn't change much in this front sector. No russian air bases are within Ukrainian territory and most russian depots have been HIMARSed already.

But things are very different on the Southern front. 8/n

This part concerns supplying the southern area from further north by rail. Simply put it's now impossible. Ukraine has already cut off any ability to bring supplies using that route directly from Russia.

The Southern front: colored in blue the main supply lines and in yellow GMLRS ranges, which force russia to unload trains far from the front.

Now we're gonna have a closer look at the three locations in the purple pentagons:
• Volnovakha
• Kerch
• Syvash

9/n



The railroad from Donetsk to Volnovakha (colored in orange) is unusable. It's in 120 mm mortar range (yellow circles) and in L119 105 mm howitzer range (green circle). Where the railroad is closest to the front it is even Javelin range - no train can pass here. Not one. 11/n

And that leaves the Kerch bridge heading into Crimea. There's a lot of info about that at the link.

[LFC]

More on Russia's supply line and mobilization problems.

Illia Ponomarenko🇺🇦
@iaponomarenko

Russia has had a hard time ensuring logistics and supplies for over 150k in Ukraine.
They barely scratched some 10k 50-year-old loan debtors with the 3rd Army Corps in summer.
Now they want +300k mobilized and deployed during winter time?
Well, good luck with that.

This is about Russia's training, or more to the point their lack of training. Anybody tossed into the ranks as part of this mobilization will be highly unprepared for what they'll likely be facing.

Russian soldiers got just a few days of basic training before being sent to Belarus starting last November (pre-invasion). themoscowtimes.com/2022/07/20/rus… 6/

During 2 visits to RU, I saw basic & unit training. It was awful. Familiarization versus qualification on rifles, rudimentary first aid, very few simulations to conserve resources, and...most importantly...horrible leadership by "drill sergeants." 7/

Officers admitted to me that theirs was a "one year" force, with some - the poorest - volunteering or being elected for leadership roles. 8/

Remember, RU soldiers get almost ALL training in units vs at basic.

How units are resourced play a big part.

One tank unit i visited near Moscow proudly told me they get 1 tank round/crew each year (US units spend hours in simulators & crews fire dozens of real rounds/year). 9/

And this is a rather eloquent answer to the question of whether mobilization would change things very much.

Corporal Frisk
@corporalfrisk

Finnish retired major-general and former (2019-2020) chief of military intelligence when asked whether mobilisation will bring decisive numbers of Russian troops to the frontline within next 6-12 months gives a one-word reply.

"No."

[LFC]

Ukraine went shopping in Kharkiv and came back with loads of goodies.

[LFC]

Panic in Russia. I first read that the line was 10km. There's since been an update.

Sotiri Dimpinoudis
@sotiridi

#Breaking: just in - The traffic jam at the border with #Russia/#Finland has pilled up to 35KM and is rising by the hour, it is the only border who is still open for Russian civilians with shengen visas, after #Putin announced he will send 300.000 new troops to #Ukraine.

It's not just at the Finnish border.

Sotiri Dimpinoudis
@sotiridi

#Update: Just in - #Russia[n civilians on social media are sharing widely that they are leaving the country by plane, bus, car, and other means of transport, even by foot by the borders to the #EU, after #Putin announced he will send 300.000 new troops to #Ukraine.

And this is what males 18-65 means in Russia.

Phillips P. OBrien
@phillipspobrien
Impressed that people need to keep saying that Russia is banning males 18 to 65 from leaving the country. The average male life expectancy in Russia is just over 66 years. We are talking about almost all living Russian males here.

Ed Franks
@edfranks
·
2h
Kremlin issued edict 2 days ago that males age 18-65 are banned from leaving Russia. Likely none of the 300K men will be deployed before weather ensures little change in lines of contact till Spring?! "Into the meat grinder: Russians react to mobilization" aje.io/jktd2q

And then there's this. Apparently 10,000 showed up. I suspect this is just round one.

Oliver Carroll
@olliecarroll

1026 arrested today in anti-mobilisation protests in 35 Russian cities today.

[LFC]

OK, what just happened?

WarMonitor🇺🇦
@warmonitor3

Recent POW swaps results:
200 Azovstal defenders for Medvedchuk
5 Azovstal commanders for 50+ Russian POWs
and 10 foreign fighters fighting for Ukraine in Mariupol.

The person who posted it at TPM said this.

It’s the foreign fighters that really raised my eyebrows. Something big just happened today and we’re not seeing what it is yet. This wasn’t just a regular swap, that’s like all of the foreign fighters that we’re aware of having been captured. They didn’t give that bargaining chip away for no reason.

Absolutely no projections or predictions what it is, just that there’s something seismic underway, between these releases, the mobilization and all that.

[LFC]

Great comment at TPM:

There’s about to be an epidemic of ankle bone spurs in Russia.

[LFC]

One analyst who has a pretty good track record says that Ukraine won't be letting up on Russia, providing them no time to regroup.

Ben Hodges
@general_ben

Charles, I believe there is no “obligatory operational pause”in the coming months. I expect Ukrainian forces will continue to maintain pressure on Russian forces, not giving them a chance to recover.

[LFC]

Another analysis of mobilization.

Thread:
1) There are more unknowns than knowns at this point
2) It is one of the most significant/riskiest political decisions Putin has ever made
3) He is still resisting a broader mobilization
4) It is an acknowledgment that Russia's war was failing and a change had to be made

Much of this depends on how this order is applied. The number of reservists with combat experience is limited, though they may include everyone who deployed to Syria. Shoigu is notoriously unreliable when it comes to figures so don't treat them as fact. 2/

There are two important immediate effects from this order: conscripts currently serving in the Russian military likely will be deployed to fight in Ukraine, and volunteers serving on short contracts will be stop-lossed into continuing to serve. 3/

In the short-term, those two steps could be enough to prevent a collapse of Russian forces. Otherwise, Russia's manpower issues could have become catastrophic this winter when many short-term volunteers likely would not sign another contract. 4/

But the war will now increasingly be fought on the Russian side by people who do not want to be there. The difference in morale, unit cohesion, and other critical factors between Ukrainian and Russian units will grow even greater. 5/

And another, this one a little more cautious on the possible impact. Two points I've quote are that in the LDNR ( Luhansk People's Republic) they've likely used up most of the men they could use. The other is that out of desperation all those short-term soldiers just had their 3-6 month contracts extended to indefinitely. Obviously Putin was worried about mass resignation as contracts expired. Those soldiers are now f***ed.

A few incomplete thoughts on the question of mobilization. It won't solve many of the RU military's challenges in this war, but it could alter the dynamic. Fair to say that these are uncharted waters, and so we should take care with deterministic or definitive claims. 1/

I wouldn't suggest that this can turn around Russia's fortunes in the war. However, I would take care being overly dismissive, especially looking out towards the medium term of this winter and 2023. Force availability and manpower matters, hence the implications can vary. 2/

The Russian military has had structural manpower deficits throughout the war leading to problems with recruitment, retention, and rotation. Units can't be rotated, leading to exhaustion. Number of refuseniks grew. Hiring short term volunteers exacerbated retention issues. 3/

Piecemeal solutions have led the Russian military to steadily cannibalize the force, using up officers, equipment, and enlisted professionals for reserve and volunteer units. Hence force quality degraded over time, as did morale, retention & exhaustion problems grew worse. 4/

Mobilizing LDNR personnel, and using them to absorb losses led to a variegated force that lacked cohesion, interoperability, and suffered from weak morale. This approach seems to have largely exhausted itself in July, few men left to forcibly mobilize in LDNR. 5/

The first and more important implication is not mobilization but enactment of stop-loss policies. Service contracts extended indefinitely, right to refuse deployment suspended, new criminal measures enacted to enforce what is a de facto introduction of wartime measures. 6/

Caveat, this is an initial interpretation of the order. But it implies that you can no longer tear up your contract in the Russian military or leave service. Volunteers who signed up for short tours (4-6 months) are now extended for the duration of the mobilization period. 7/

[LFC]

More on the prisoner swap. Putin must have really wanted Medvedchuk pretty badly. It's not for morale. Apparently Medvedchuk isn't all that popular in Russia.

As part of prisoner swap with the Russian occupiers, Ukraine has succeeded in freeing 215 Ukrainian defenders, including 10 foreigners. The Ukrainian businessman and pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk, who is the godfather of Putin’s daughter, together with 55 Russian occupiers have been returned to Russia.