Post by LFC on Apr 13, 2021 21:17:38 GMT
This is a good description of how the right-wing SCOTUS just quietly elevated the right to religious freedom to a level above all other rights.
Although the conservative majority’s decision was unsigned and ran just four pages long, it radically altered the law of religious liberty. Since 1990’s Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the First Amendment’s free exercise clause to require religious exemptions to laws that don’t discriminate against religion. In Tandon, however, the majority effectively overturned Smith by establishing a new rule, often called the “most favored nation” theory. Under this doctrine, any secular exemption to a law automatically creates a claim for a religious exemption, vastly expanding the government’s obligation to provide religious accommodations to countless regulations. In Tandon, for instance, the Supreme Court held that California had to let people gather indoors for Bible study because it allowed them to gather indoors to get a haircut, eat, or take a bus; if Californians can get pedicure, they must also be permitted to spend hours in close quarters discussing the Bible. And the Supreme Court created this sweeping new rule through its shadow docket—those cases decided with minimal briefing and no oral argument outside the court’s normal procedure.
On Monday, I spoke with University of Texas School of Law Professor Steve Vladeck, a renowned critic of the shadow docket, and Lewis and Clark Law School Professor Jim Oleske, an expert on religious liberty jurisprudence, about Friday’s decision and its departure from all known rules of Supreme Court procedure. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Mark Joseph Stern: Jim, you’ve said Tandon begins with a “whopper.” What is it?
Jim Oleske: In the very beginning, the court said its prior decisions had “made the following points clear.” It then laid out the “most favored nation” theory of religious exemptions. The principal authority cited is the Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo decision from this past fall—in which the court did not adopt that theory! Instead, the court said that New York had singled out religion for disfavored treatment, which would be consistent with Smith. It was only in separate opinions that various justices talked about “most favored nation” theory explicitly—the same justices who were talking about it in dissents over the summer before Justice Amy Coney Barrett had joined the court.
How does this new theory conflict with Smith?
Oleske: Smith says the free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects against the government targeting religious practice for disfavored treatment, but does not grant a right to exemptions from general law. Almost immediately after Smith, there were efforts to read into it a broader “most favored nation” theory that said: Any time the government grants an exemption to a law, it has an obligation to grant a religious exemption, too, unless the government meets strict scrutiny. But that was not the law of the land until Friday night.
Steve Vladeck: I think Friday night’s ruling drives home exactly why the rise of the shadow docket is so problematic. To be a little nerdy for a second, what the Supreme Court did on Friday was issue an injunction pending appeal. This is an extraordinary form of relief. Unlike when the court issues a stay—where it says, hey, lower courts we’re putting your decision on hold—here the court is acting directly against the government. It’s directly enjoining Gov. Newsom when lower courts have refused to do so.
As the Supreme Court has said for decades, its authority to issue that form of relief is very limited. There’s a very widely cited in-chambers opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia from 1986 where he says the court is only supposed to issue such relief “sparingly, and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances,” where “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.” It’s the “indisputably clear” part that makes what Jim said so important. Everyone understands that the court made new law on Friday, that the court changed the scope and meaning and applicability of the free exercise clause. Folks are going to disagree about whether or not this new approach is a good one. My point is, this is not something the court is allowed to do in a shadow docket ruling like this. Its own precedents preclude it from making new law in this context because, by definition, a newly minted right cannot have been “indisputably clear.”
On Monday, I spoke with University of Texas School of Law Professor Steve Vladeck, a renowned critic of the shadow docket, and Lewis and Clark Law School Professor Jim Oleske, an expert on religious liberty jurisprudence, about Friday’s decision and its departure from all known rules of Supreme Court procedure. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Mark Joseph Stern: Jim, you’ve said Tandon begins with a “whopper.” What is it?
Jim Oleske: In the very beginning, the court said its prior decisions had “made the following points clear.” It then laid out the “most favored nation” theory of religious exemptions. The principal authority cited is the Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo decision from this past fall—in which the court did not adopt that theory! Instead, the court said that New York had singled out religion for disfavored treatment, which would be consistent with Smith. It was only in separate opinions that various justices talked about “most favored nation” theory explicitly—the same justices who were talking about it in dissents over the summer before Justice Amy Coney Barrett had joined the court.
How does this new theory conflict with Smith?
Oleske: Smith says the free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects against the government targeting religious practice for disfavored treatment, but does not grant a right to exemptions from general law. Almost immediately after Smith, there were efforts to read into it a broader “most favored nation” theory that said: Any time the government grants an exemption to a law, it has an obligation to grant a religious exemption, too, unless the government meets strict scrutiny. But that was not the law of the land until Friday night.
Steve Vladeck: I think Friday night’s ruling drives home exactly why the rise of the shadow docket is so problematic. To be a little nerdy for a second, what the Supreme Court did on Friday was issue an injunction pending appeal. This is an extraordinary form of relief. Unlike when the court issues a stay—where it says, hey, lower courts we’re putting your decision on hold—here the court is acting directly against the government. It’s directly enjoining Gov. Newsom when lower courts have refused to do so.
As the Supreme Court has said for decades, its authority to issue that form of relief is very limited. There’s a very widely cited in-chambers opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia from 1986 where he says the court is only supposed to issue such relief “sparingly, and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances,” where “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.” It’s the “indisputably clear” part that makes what Jim said so important. Everyone understands that the court made new law on Friday, that the court changed the scope and meaning and applicability of the free exercise clause. Folks are going to disagree about whether or not this new approach is a good one. My point is, this is not something the court is allowed to do in a shadow docket ruling like this. Its own precedents preclude it from making new law in this context because, by definition, a newly minted right cannot have been “indisputably clear.”
So any law that has any carve out for any group for any reason must also take into account religion above and beyond every other group. Welcome to the theocratic SCOTUS.